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Day: Auto-Documentality

Recently Michael Buckland (2017) discovered that, presaging the famous figure of
the antelope in Suzanne Briet’s Qu’est-ce que la documentation? (Briet, 1951),
there was the concept of “autodocument” with the figure of a gorilla in her student
Robert Pagès’ work.
What this poses in terms of the epistemology of documentation as applied
to beings is the possibility that a document is not fully created by documentary
primary and secondary ontologies as Briet suggested, but rather that beings, as well
as natural entities more fully, also act as self-evidential signs. What powers of being
evident exist for the antelope—or any entity—before its capture and cataloging?
Can we speak of it being a document outside of documentation?
In this paper, extrapolating from my forthcoming book Documentarity:
Evidence, Ontology, and Inscription, I’d like to explore such self-evidentiality in
terms of human, non-human, and, more broadly speaking, natural entities.1 I’d like
to explore this in terms of two analyses: first, that of rights discourses from 17thcentury Western Europe onward; and second, according to an epistemology of what
the philosopher Rom Harré (1995) has called “powerful particulars.” I will discuss
rights through a conceptual-historical notion of rights drift from the beginnings of
modernity up until the present time. And I will discuss powerful particulars in terms
of dispositional powers and their affordances.
I. Natural and Human Rights
Most of the history of human moral theory has been about obligation rights, not
innate rights of freedom of expression. One was born in a socially or theologically
“natural” order and so one had repons-ibilities. One responded to the needs of
others within social or theological systems that gave one certain powers or “rights,”
or not. Such systems tended to be hierarchical in terms of obligations, though there
were obligations in the reverse, as well, if for no other practical reason than that of
maintaining the system itself. A citizen-subject was obliged to serve the king, the
servant to serve masters, children to serve parents, animals to serve their owners,
and aristocrats to serve (in a manner of speaking) the rules of aristocratic behavior,
as well as sometimes to be benevolent to those beneath them. The notion of natural
rights as rights of powers of expression free from social rules and roles of behavior
is a rather unique metaphysical concept, which we see valorized in the writings of
John Locke and in the innate or “natural” rights accorded to persons in subsequent
national documents, such as the United States Constitution.
If obligation rights were defined by powers of service that were accorded to
one by assumed transcendental states of being or by more powerful others, natural
rights theory from the 17th century onward has stressed powers possessed by
1

I use the neologism documentarity in that book for a specific critical reason that is not fully
applicable here, where I use in my title the usual term, documentality.
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individuals, either by their belonging in groups—foremost, the group of human
beings—or by being selves with particular innate qualities. They are what we could
call expressive rights. Consequently, personal identity no longer simply has been
positioned in the grids of moral rules and roles that define social personhood—i.e.,
being a mother, being a professor, being a doctor, etc.—but rather, it also includes
an element of selfhood known by potential and unique powers.
It’s important to recognize that this notion of self in personal psychology
also came about at the time of the rise of experimentalism. Experimentalism is
based on controlling variables in order to allow innate qualities to be expressed.
The theory of natural rights as innate powers—dispositions—has analogues in the
natural sciences, where innate powers are expressed by entities within given
conditions. The common core is the notion that particulars are powerful, at least
within certain conditions of expression and certain ways of understanding those
conditions. In natural rights theory, the powers of particulars are attributable to
some sort of innate powers that are “inalienable,” or cannot be taken away. They
are “natural,” in this sense, to the entity involved.
Human rights apply to all those entities considered to be human. As we
know, this has been anything but an uncontentious concept since the 17th century.
For example, during the Spanish and Portuguese colonialism of the Americas, the
Valladolid debate (1550–1551) discussed whether the native peoples could be
considered to be humans on par with their European counterparts. Mercantile
slavery took darker skin–colored African or African descendants to be objects of
ownership, akin to farm animals and other tools of labor and trade. Women didn’t
have rights to vote in most countries until the 20th century. The spread of
inalienable rights of expression and agency across many social arenas has occurred
over several centuries.
We should also note that modern human rights, following natural rights, has
two pillars: freedoms of expression, and more recently, in the post–World War II
era, freedom of access to information. The latter is meant to extend the former at
the level of governmental information, though with some restrictions meant to keep
“state secrets.” States, as human beings, have rights of not only expressive powers,
but of restrictive silence upon such within their own documents and upon others.
II. Rights of Truth
If human rights have spread from being individual rights of expression to being
individual rights of access to information in the 20th century, this latter right has
spread beyond “information” understood as documents to the international law
principle of the Right to Truth. This principle, which is more well known in Latin
America and post-Apartheid South Africa than in the Anglo-American sphere,
affords relatives of victims of military dictatorships and other “states of exception”
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within national histories the right to know what has happened to their family
members. In principle, it also sometimes allows for the nation as a whole to find
out the truth of what has happened. Though the right to truth presupposes
documentary evidence, it also demands a broader articulation of the meaning of
those documents toward revealing the truth of an event.
Rights to truth often occur within contexts of the erasure of events from
history. They often occur, as well, in the context of the need to address the past by
a need for a future, a future based on confession and sometimes political
reconciliation. In Yasmin Naqvi’s words, “the right to the truth stands somewhere
on the threshold of a legal norm and a narrative device” (Naqvi, 2006). As such,
the right to truth brings into focus the narrative and contextual nature of human
rights. Human rights belong to those for whom certain expressions and evidence
make sense for others. Speech is a “right” for those who have the apparatuses to
speak, but there is no such thing as a right to “free speech” per se. Rather, there is
a right to make expressions by whatever means. Speech itself is only inalienable as
a physical affordance; meaningful speech (even if a grunt) is a cultural and social
affordance, and so this is what its “freedom” refers to. All such expression finds
meaning, and also limitations or pressures for limitation, in language acts.
This issue becomes even more pressing if we consider the limitations for
rights to truth when applied to prehistorical genocides or genocides whose
recordings are not in the form of writing, or at least alphabetical writing. Even in
the midst of political and social repression, the onus is upon the victims to speak in
the terms of the likely victors. Truth, as is often said, belongs to the victors—but
not only in terms of documents, and not only in terms of having the last word, but
in terms of having the right words, or words at all. If truth is a function of
documents, and the nature of documentary evidence, particularly in written form,
is limited to the victors, then it is difficult to produce evidence of what happened in
any fair manner. Moreover, history itself is often seen in terms of written
documents.
The right to truth, by bringing documents into a dialectical communicative
arena for social and political debate and into the arena of truth tribunals, allows
truth to come forward in not only content, but form. Conversation can bring things
into light that can be hidden by the univocal plane of writing. Just by asking
questions, people can confess to what they can hide in writing. With conversation,
even history can be brought into the present, maybe not fully in the way it was, but
in the manner it is seen by those fully expressing it in the present and into the future.
III. Animal Rights
It isn’t with lack of tact that we go from discussing the rights of those human beings
who have been denied human rights to the rights of non-human animals. Repressed
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and enslaved human beings are often treated and given the ontological rights of
non-human animals—treated as beasts of burden and treated as “wild” animals.
What is it that animals are seen to lack in the Western tradition, that is then
attributed to humans? The answer is, in brief, representations of current experience
and the ability to infer future (and past) events from this.
Jean-François Lhermitte in his book, L’Animal vertueux dans la philosophie
antique à l’époque imperial (Lhermitte & Burgat, 2015, p. 165), argues that in
Aristotle’s works human and animal sensibility or perception (αἴσθησις) is
differentiated according to the former’s relationship to logos (λόγος), so that
perception is a “full perception,” that is, simultaneously a sensual representation
(φαντασία αἰσθητική) and a deliberative representation (φαντασία βουλευτική).
Deliberative representation is characterized by the human ability to infer
from one example to many and to abstract from this, so that, for example, humans
create moral values. It isn’t just inference from a single example that is being
claimed, but the ability to create concepts by means of phantasia or representations.
This ability to form concepts has often been confused with having language
itself, and having language has been confused with having this or that language.
History is replete with examples of authors giving privilege to this or that language
for thinking this or that type of concept, with such being seen as a sign of a “higher”order cognitive ability. The belief in the great order of being is drawn up of not only
linguistic registers, but epistemic ones.
So, too, have animals been ranked as being companions or being food for
human beings by matter of their ability to be domesticated (and within
domestication there are divisions as well, of course, as often “domestication” means
being ready to be consumed). In terms of animal closeness to the human life-world,
membership can have its privileges, at least for the moment.
Humans, as it were, have given themselves rights of giving self-evidence.
And as humans, they have the right to evidence itself in so far as evidence
corresponds to concepts of proof. Just as “raw data is any oxymoron,” so raw
evidence of any sort is an oxymoron.
There are other ways of understanding animal being, however, that are
informational, and not just as evidence. Eduardo Kohn (2013), in his work on the
Runa people and their natural environment in Ecuador’s Upper Amazon, discusses
information communicationally, as semiotic affects in Peircian indexical
relationships. One of his examples is that of a falling tree that causes the monkeys
to call out warnings. We also see such in songbirds, for example, where the sighting
of a hawk causes a tsunami of warnings to spread through the forest, beginning with
chickadees and titmice and progressing to jays and larger birds. Here, the evidence
of a hawk occurs in the transmission of information along communicative trains.
“Information” does not end in a representational concept, but rather the concept is
embodied in the trains of communication it occurs in. This is somewhat similar to
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Latour’s (1987, 1996) concept of information, in which information is the process
of communication up and down streams in lines of production of meaning and
knowledge (for example, from scientific field work to article publication to use in
further field work). Information here isn’t iconic, but rather is communicative and,
in Kohn’s work, affective. It assumes a sort of affective machinics of both
signifying and a-signifying semiotics, to put it in Félix Guattari and Gilles
Deleuze’s terms.
For Kohn (2013), not only animals, but entire ecosystems “think” and
express themselves. In this, they give evidence of themselves as themselves. The
notion of individual and group being is here blurred.
IV. Rights of Nature
If not only humans but animals can give evidence of themselves as powerful
particulars, recent law, emanating from the United States but given most
pronounced expression in Ecuador’s famous Chapter 7 of Title 2 of their
Constitution of 2008 which gives rights to “Pachamama” and Bolivia’s Ley de
Derechos de la Madre Tierra of 2010, grants such to larger ecosystems than what
we ordinarily see as organic bodies. Trees, forests, lakes, and so forth are granted
rights, not just as offshoots of civil law judgments between humans, but sui generis
(Stone, 2010). Like Kohn’s notions of forests “speaking,” this perspective assumes
autonomous bodies made up of large ecosystems. It grants ecological systems rights
of rights-bearing entities like human beings (and, in the United States, like other
legal “organisms,” such as corporations). Such bodies are “superorganisms” that
are granted, by legal analogy and institution, rights on the level of intention-bearing
human beings.
V. Rights Drift and Powers of Evidence
What we see in this “rights drift” from human beings to natural bodies to
ecosystems in Western modernity is an increasing tendency to extend a certain
concept of innate human rights to animals of all sorts and even to ecologies. This
drift is one tied to the notion of innate powers resting in particulars, what we have
called, in Rom Harré’s (1995) phrase, “powerful particulars.” For Harré, powerful
particulars can be described within an epistemology of dispositions and
affordances. In the past several hundred years in the West, expressive rights have
expanded, and obligation rights have shrunk. Rights of expression are claimed for
organisms, parts of organisms, and superorganisms and, at least with humans,
against both intentional and unintentional repressions of such rights. If any self is
built up of available expressive parts for deployments in new situations, then are
humans so unique? Can we separate the learned skill “toolboxes” that make up the
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self from the cellular toolboxes that make up any superorganism? With this line of
thought, the lines between intentional beings and “unintentional” or “nonconscious” beings become blurrier, and so with that, the notion of the self has
expanded to include “particulars” made up solely of combinations of “cellular”
units. All multi-cellular organisms, thus, may be seen as having intention, as well,
and so, at least speculatively, we would have to consider their availability to having
rights, as well. (As absurd as it sounds, will we someday even entertain cancer
ecologies as having rights, perhaps?)
How are such powerful particulars conceptualized in distinction to
traditional documentary ontology? First, there is the notion that beings are not just
to be recognized in terms of their category inclusion or class (for example, this
antelope is an example of a new species of antelope, or even of antelopes
altogether). Beings, or entities more broadly, are recognized as having inherent
powers as particulars, which in the case of inorganic entities often is included in
their class identities, but in in the case of (particularly higher-level) organisms
constitute a uniqueness that is also due to the role of learning from experience.
Somewhat contrary to the expansion of rights discourse to all types of
entities that we discussed above, we could assert that inorganic individuals are
closely aligned to class identities because the expression of their powers in regard
to certain contextual affordances are causally necessary at some common level of
analysis. Iron is attracted to a magnet or it is not iron. The relation is causal and any
change to the iron will make it less or not iron. There may be different cultural
symbols associated with iron—“iron,” “Fe,” etc.—however all these refer to the
same entity made up of necessary dispositional powers. Inorganic materials are in
this way reductive to their physical dispositions (that is, to physical powers that are
more or less innate in them).
Organic entities, however, learn from experience. Their physical
dispositions may be innate, but how they are used greatly depends on the cultural
forms for expression and the social norms for those expressions. Their physical
dispositions can also be modified, based on the cultural and social norms in which
physical dispositions are expressed, such as is the case with an athlete’s body that
has been trained in a certain type of sport.
Higher-level organisms have a greater level of potential expressions in their
dispositions (particularly the socially and culturally derived ones). Their
dispositions are “potential” and their expressions correlational to their potentials,
rather than possible and causal. Their toolboxes of expression are “virtual” in this
sense and are actualized rather than “possible” and “realized” (to use the language
of Gilles Deleuze, 1994). For example, if we want to know a person’s ability to
speak French, we ask them to speak French or we look for a language diploma in
French. We could look in their brains for French, but this would be useless, because
all we would find are neurons that perhaps could be correlated to the speaking or
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writing of French. And even if we did say that they could speak French by asking
them to do such or looking at a diploma for such, there is no absolute manner by
which we could say that this or that person speaks French, since there are many
different ways of measuring fluency, which would apply even to a native speaker.
Another example of the hypothetical nature of judging the dispositions of higherlevel organisms would be that of measuring IQ by giving an IQ test. It may be that
a person achieves different scores on such a test on different days or with different
forms of the test. The person hasn’t gained or lost intelligence between these
occurrences, but rather a test is a measure of a singular performance by a person,
not of intelligence lying in the brain or elsewhere. We may infer the latter, but we
cannot physiologically reduce cultural and social traces. Evidence of a higher-level
organism’s social or cultural being cannot be reduced to physiological causes.
Returning to Pagès’ and Briet’s works, we can say that if a rock has
properties of self-evidence, it is because of necessary qualities that fit within
documentary categories. Whether weighed in pounds or kilograms, whether called
yellow or red, if I stub my toe on a rock, it hurts. Such objects are very well suited
to what Briet called “initial classification”—documentary ontologies—because the
attributes given to a thing by documentary categories are relatively unperturbed by
powers of expression inherent in the particulars. Particularly with inorganic entities,
such expressive possibilities can be near zero when observed at ordinary levels.
Antelopes and gorillas, however are beings with some variability among
individuals in their expressive behaviors. We cannot as easily say that an example
of one particular is the same as another with the same degree of confidence as we
can say, on ordinary observation at least, that this and that rock both have the
inherent properties of quartz. The particular is singular rather than simply being an
individual among other individuals in a group. We may have an example of a
species of bird in an aviary which can help us as an example of a species type by
which we then can compare one species with another, but this type–token
relationship misses the particular and can only tell us at a physical level about not
only the class of bird but the individual. (Even class relationships are difficult to
tell in the case of birds, however, since birds have many hybrids, separated into
subspecies by means of song, territory, etc.). To account for the being of a particular
being in the case of organic and, particularly, higher-order animals, we must also
look at the behaviors of individuals, not just at the physical parts involved.
For agency rights, at least, the self is fundamental to expression. It is more
fundamental than “speech,” because speech as an inalienable right is but a trope for
the concept of expression, of which speech proper is only one form. “Free speech”
means the expressions of a self. “Free” refers to the ability to have a choice of
making expressions. And though there are not any contexts where meaningful
expressions can be said to be totally within the domains of the choice of individuals,
since language is a social event and context normalizes meaning, nonetheless the
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self is said to be free by having the option of making or not making expressions out
of repertoires of available scripts.
VI. Iconic Representations
As has been mentioned, one of the characteristics that is said to give humans the
particular quality of being self-evidential as humans as a species and as particular
human beings is their ability to create concepts out of experiences. Deliberative
thought is not simply the application of previous experiences to new situations, but
the ability to consider the future as a real and not just speculative hypothetical and
to decide to apply this or that set of experiences to that hypothetical. Indeed, the
very notion of the future as a durational, experiential notion is dependent upon such
an ability.
Expressionist and phenomenological philosophies show us several manners
by which humans become self-evidential as a type of being: awareness of their
physical and temporal existence, use of sophisticated linguistic tools, abstract
concepts (such as “world”), and an ability to conceptualize their existence as being
finite. These constitute the epistemic and affective bonds of humans with other
humans and the means by which they can bond with other beings in the world.
However, another manner that bonds humans is deliberative thought. What,
however, are the tools of such thought? Certainly, logic and other techniques and
methods of inference are such. Also concepts or ideas, understood as forms or
constellations of meaningful signs and their correlative actions upon the empirical
world and upon other meaningful signs, generating what we often differentiate in
English as action and thought. It is important to note that in modernity, much of
deliberative thought, as well as the temporal progress and the notion of temporality
as progressive and as progress, is dependent on documents. This is not only true in
knowledge institutions, but also in everyday life. Bourgeois worlds are made
possible by means of texts and documents, in order to both understand the world
beyond one’s present circumstances and time and for advancing through it by
means of certificates such as degrees and, as Buckland (2014) suggests, passports
and other such documents for practical identification.
This is a notion of documentality that is not representationally reductive in
the manner that documentation theory in libraries and bibliography has done.
Contrary to our usual way of thinking about them, all documents, including iconic
or “representational” ones, are used in pragmatic, indexical manners. As Latour
points out, a map doesn’t represent a mountain in the sense of imagining it in an
exact manner, but rather, provides a means of negotiating it (Latour, 1996). It
prescribes, rather than describes, an action. Documentality is prescriptive,
documentation is descriptive.
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However, we can use an iconic picture of a mountain in a prescriptive task
for making aesthetic judgments, as well. Passports, too, are means to an end, but
they can also be used as imaginations of personhood; they not only enact
citizenship, but they also can be taken as depictions of individuals at certain times
of their lives. But such representational acts by documents follow from their use.
Indeed, in the final analysis, all descriptive acts are also prescriptive; all
documentation is documental, though not all documental activities result in
representational documents.
The representational imagination, however, is a powerful tool in thinking
about evidence and entities, even when it functions in the world of fantasy. Otlet’s
imagination that documents somehow represent knowledge is a falsification of the
material processes of creating and inscribing knowledge, but it had the pragmatic
end of making sense of all the documentary materials in the world in a single
collection, however ridiculous such a notion is. Plato’s realm of ideal forms, too, is
a silly idea of what is true, but it launched philosophy as a task of seeking truth
from the blurred senses of the phenomenological world. Imaging that cancer is a
single disease is certainly not true, but it allows us to set the goal of having
epistemic, computational, and therapeutic procedures that we hope can outwit local,
rapidly evolutionary processes of cell division and colonization. Imaging the world
as “mother earth” is a purely anthropocentric image, but this metaphorical image
allows us to attempt to see the earth as something that gave birth to us.
These imaginations are part of the self-evidence of human nature, which
however erroneous or fictional have a role in how humans make sense of the world.
They are not simply fictional or mythical, but rather they also at times pervade the
material pragmatics of science and scientific knowing. They are evidence of a
transcendental will to power, as Nietzsche had it, that goes beyond the self, beyond
powerful particulars.
As we see in Otlet’s works, and more in an applied manner in Briet’s works,
and as we know from the foundational role that ontologies have in science,
representations generally, and class representations more particularly, have a strong
role in our theorization and practices of documentation. Like in all practices, it is
necessary to think carefully about when to deploy these devices in practice and
theory, because they have consequences not just in documentation activities, but
they also come to characterize moral or “practical” activities, such as defining
rights-bearing entities and activities.
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